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Abstract 
 
A directly public verifiable signcryption scheme is 
introduced in this paper that provides the security 
attributes of message confidentiality, authentication, 
integrity, non-repudiation, unforgeability, and forward 
secrecy of message confidentiality. It provides the 
attribute of direct public verifiability so anyone can 
verify the signcryption without any need for any secret 
information from the corresponding participants. The 
proposed scheme is based on elliptic curve cryptography 
and is so suitable for environments with resource 
constraints. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The signcryption is a cryptographic technique that tries to 
fulfill the functionalities of digital signature and 
encryption in a single logical step, and decreases the 
computational costs and communication overheads in 
comparison with the traditional sign-then-encrypt 
schemes. Several signcryption schemes [1-7] are 
proposed over the years, each of them providing different 
level of security services and computational costs. 
A signcryption scheme should simultaneously provide 
the security attributes of encryption and digital signature 
that mainly include: Confidentiality, Unforgeability, 
Integrity, and Non-repudiation. Some signcryption 
schemes provide further attributes such as public 
verifiability and forward secrecy of message 
confidentiality while the others do not provide them. 
Some signcryption schemes are based on elliptic curve 
cryptography while the others use traditional approaches. 
The elliptic curve-based approaches can attain to a 
desired security level with significantly smaller keys that 
lead to efficient use of power, bandwidth, and storage 
that are basic limitations for resource-constrained 
environments. 
 In this paper, an elliptic curve-based signcryption 
scheme is introduced that provides the attributes of 
message confidentiality, authentication, integrity, 
unforgeability, non-repudiation, direct public 
verifiability, and forward secrecy of message 
confidentiality. The rest of this paper is organized as 
follows. Our proposed scheme is presented at Section 2 
and its security attributes are analyzed in Section 3. 
Section 4 considers the computational costs, and Section 
5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Proposed Scheme 
 
The proposed signcryption scheme consists of three 
phases: Initialization, Signcryption, and Unsigncryption 
that are described in following sections. Throughout this 
paper, Alice is sender, Bob is recipient, and Mallory is the 
malicious active attacker. 
 
2.1. Initialization 
 
Domain parameters of the proposed scheme consist of a 
suitably selected elliptic curve E defined over a finite 
field qF  with the Weierstrass equation of the form 
baxxy  32  and a base point )( qFEG  in which q 
is a large prime number. In order to make the elliptic 
curve non-singular, qFba ,  should satisfy 
)(mod0274 23 qba   [8]. To guard against small 
subgroup attacks, the point G should be of a prime order 
n or equivalently, OnG   where O denotes the point of 
elliptic curve at infinity, and we should have qn 4  
[9]. To protect against other known attacks on special 
classes of elliptic curves, n should not divide 1iq  for 
all Vi 1 ( 20V  suffices in practice), qn  should 
be satisfied, and the curve should be non-supersingular 
[9]. To retain the intractability of ECDLP, n should at 
least satisfy 1602n  for the common applications. 
 The private keys of Alice and Bob are randomly 
selected integers ]1,1[,  nww RBA  and their public 
keys are calculated as GwW AA   and GwW BB   
respectively. Alice and Bob are uniquely identified by 
their unique identifiers AID  and BID . They get digital 
certificates ACert  and BCert  for their public keys from 
the Certificate Authority (CA). If CA is not involved in 
the public key generation, it is necessary for CA to verify 
that each entity really possesses the corresponding 
private key of its claimed public key. This can be 
accomplished by a zero-knowledge technique. It should 
also be verified that the public keys belong to the main 
group.  
 
2.2. Signcryption 
 
A schema of signcryption and unsigncryption stages of 
the proposed scheme is depicted in Figure 1. Alice 
generates the signcrypted text ),,( sCR  by following the 
below steps: 
(1) Checks the validity of BCert  and uses it for 
verifying BW . The process of certificate validation 
includes [10]: 
 Verifying the integrity and authenticity of the 
certificate by verifying the CA's signature on the 
certificate. 
 Verifying that the certificate is not expired. 
 Verifying that the certificate is not revoked. 
(2) Randomly selects an integer ]1,1[  nr R . 
(3) Computes rGR   where ),( RR yxR   in which 
Rx / Ry denotes the x/y-coordinate of the point R. 
(4) Computes BAR WwxrK )~(   where ),( KK yxK  , 
and     )2mod(2~ 2/2/ fRfR xx   in which 
  1log2  nf  is the bit length of n,  .  denotes the 
floor, and  .  indicates the ceiling. If OK   she 
goes back to step 2. Otherwise, she drives the 
session key of encryption as 
)||||||( BKAK IDyIDxHk   in which H is a one-
way hash function that generates the required 
number of bits as the secret key of deployed 
symmetric encryption algorithm, and || denotes the 
concatenation. 
(5) Computes the ciphertext as )(MEC k  in which 
(.)kE  denotes a strong symmetric encryption 
algorithm (e.g. AES) that uses session key k for the 
encryption. 
(6) Computes the digital signature as 
)(modnrtws A   in which 
)||||||||( BRAR IDyIDxCHt  . 
(7) Sends the signcrypted text ),,( sCR  to Bob. 
 
2.3. Unsigncryption 
 
Bob who received the signcrypted text ),,( sCR , follows 
the below steps to extract the plaintext and verify the 
signature: 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The proposed scheme 
 
(1) Checks the validity of ACert  and uses it for 
verifying AW . 
(2) Computes ),()~( KKARB yxWxRwK   and 
derives the session key as 
)||||||( BKAK IDyIDxHk  . 
(3) Decrypts the ciphertext as )(CDM k . 
(4) Computes )||||||||( BRAR IDyIDxCHt  . 
(5) Accepts M as the correct plaintext of Alice if and 
only if AtWRsG  . Otherwise, he rejects M. 
 
3. Security Analysis 
 
The correctness of the proposed scheme can be simply 
verified since Alice and Bob reach to the same point K on 
the elliptic curve: 
),()~(
)~()~(
KKBARB
BARBARA
yxKWxRw
GwwxrWwxrK


             (1) 
 Defining Rx~  as the least significant half in binary 
representation of Rx  is just a trade-off between security 
and efficiency. The proposed scheme deploys a strong 
key establishment. It tries to improve and match ideas 
behind MQV [11] and HMQV [12] protocols for its own 
case. The session key establishment part of the proposed 
scheme has itself the following security attributes: 
 
a. Known session key security: Each message is 
signcrypted with a unique session key since random 
number r is used for session key establishment. The 
session key will also differ for different recipients 
since their public keys are involved in key derivation 
function. 
 
b. Resilience to Unknown-Key Share (UKS) attack: The 
UKS attack [9] is thwarted in the proposed scheme 
since identifiers of both Alice and Bob are involved in 
the session key derivation function. 
 
c. Resilience to Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) 
attack: Under intractability of ECDLP, the KCI attack 
[9] is thwarted in the proposed scheme. An adversary 
that could obtain Aw  should find the corresponding r 
of R in order to deduce the corresponding session key 
that is generally in deposit of solving the ECDLP. 
 
d. Partial Forward secrecy: Session key derivation 
function of the proposed scheme provides partial 
forward secrecy since even if Aw  is revealed, finding 
the corresponding random number r is still necessary 
that is generally in deposit of solving the ECDLP. 
 
 Table 1 shows the provided attributes of the proposed 
scheme and those of other schemes. Hereunder, a brief 
proof is given for the claimed attributes.  
 
1) Confidentiality: The proposed scheme is supposed to 
deploy a strong block cipher so the secrecy resides in the 
established session key. As it was described, the session 
key establishment provides several security attributes. 
Ultimately, an adversary has only two ways to defeat the 
confidentiality: having Bw , or deriving both Aw  and r 
that are in deposit of solving the ECDLP.  
 
2) Authentication: The proposed scheme is certificate-
based, and certificates are verified by both sender and 
recipient. An implicit authentication is also involved in 
session key establishment so only the correct party that 
has the true private key can reach to correct key 
agreement and perform the unsigncryption. An 
authentication is also accomplished when one verifies the 
signcryption. 
 
3) Unforgeability: Mallory cannot forge the valid 
),,( sRC  with his malicious ),,( sRC  . A valid forged 
signature s' should satisfy Awttss )(   so 
knowledge of Aw  is necessary. Otherwise, he cannot 
truly forge the signature and the forged signature will be 
simply recognized when verifying the signcryption. 
 
4) Non-repudiation: This can be deduced from 
unforgeability. It is computationally infeasible to forge 
the signature without having Aw . 
 
5) Integrity: The hash value of ciphertext concatenated 
with some variable parameters is involved in 
signcryption so it changes with any alteration in the 
plaintext. The integrity is guarantied by security 
attributes of hash function and unforgeability of the 
signature. Mallory should also have the valid session key 
to encrypt his modified message. Otherwise, the altered 
message will not be correctly decrypted by Bob. The 
integrity is also implicitly verified when verifying the 
signcryption. 
 
6) Forward secrecy of message confidentiality: As a one-
pass scheme and without any session-specific input from 
Bob, we cannot prospect the proposed scheme for the 
Perfect Forward Secrecy but it provides the partial 
forward secrecy under intractability of the ECDLP. It 
means that even if Aw  is revealed, the adversary should 
not be capable of decrypting the previously signcrypted 
texts. It is an obvious attribute of the proposed scheme 
since if one wants to defeat the confidentiality, it is 
necessary to have the corresponding random number r. 
 
Table 1. A comparison between provided attributes 
of different signcryption schemes 
 
Table 2. Required number of field operations for 
different signcryption schemes 
Signcryption 
schemes Participant Exp Div ECPM ECPA Mul Add Hash
Zheng [1] Alice 1 1 - - - 1 2 Bob 2 - - - 2 - 2 
Jung et al. [2] Alice 2 1 - - - 1 2 Bob 3 - - - 1 - 2 
Bao and Deng [4] Alice 2 1 - - - 1 3 Bob 3 - - - 1 - 3 
Gamage et al. [5] Alice 2 1 - - - 1 2 Bob 3 - - - 1 - 2 
Zheng and Imai [3] Alice - 1 1 - 1 1 2 Bob - - 2 1 2 - 2 
Han et al. [6] Alice - 1 2 - 2 1 2 Bob - 1 3 1 2 - 2 
Hwang et al. [7] Alice - - 2 - 1 1 1 Bob - - 3 1 - - 1 
The proposed 
Scheme 
Alice - - 2 - 2 2 2 
Bob - - 4 2 - - 2 
Exp (modular Exponentiation), Div (modular Division/inverse), ECPM 
(Elliptic Curve Point Multiplication), ECPA (Elliptic Curve Point 
Addition), Mul (modular Multiplication), Add (modular Addition), 
Hash (one-way Hash function). 
 
7) Direct Public verifiability: Anyone who observes the 
transmitted ),,( sCR  can compute 
)||||||||( BRAR IDyIDxCHt   and directly verify the 
signcryption by checking AtWRsG  . 
 
4. Computational Costs  
 
Table 2 shows the computational costs of different 
schemes including the proposed scheme with respect to 
different kinds of required operations, in which the 
computational costs of verifications and symmetric 
encryption are neglected. Let   1log2  n  denotes the 
bit-length of modulus n. Using the conventional methods, 
the running time for modular addition and subtraction is 
of )(O  while it is of )( 2O  for modular multiplication 
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Zheng [1] No Yes Yes Using another Protocol Yes No 
Jung et al. [2] No Yes Yes Using another Protocol Yes Yes
Zheng and Imai [3] No Yes Yes Using another Protocol Yes No 
Bao and Deng [4] No Yes Yes Directly Yes No 
Gamage et al. [5] Yes Yes Yes Directly Yes No 
Han et al. [6]  No No No Directly No No 
Hwang et al. [7] No No No Directly No No 
The proposed Scheme Yes Yes Yes Directly Yes Yes
and division, and is of )( 3O  for modular 
exponentiation and inverse calculation [13]. Total 
number of operations for calculating SHA-1 and MD5 
hash functions are calculated as 1110 and 744 bit 
operations respectively [14]. Elliptic curve point 
multiplication is a time-consuming operation for which 
several methods are proposed in literature but selecting 
the efficient algorithm is complicated by many factors 
[8]. For the case of elliptic curve P-192 defined 
over )122( 64192 pGF , which provides the same 
level of security as that of RSA with 1024-bits modulus, 
total required number of operations for a point 
multiplication, for the case of an unknown point using 
the Window NAF method on Jacobian-Chudnovsky 
coordinate is reported in [8] as: 
InvMulECPM TTT 1936Chudnovsky-Jacobian    (2) 
For the same curve, the computational cost of an elliptic 
curve point addition in Jacobian projective coordinate [8] 
is: 
AddMulECPA TTT
Jacobian
716     (3) 
The computational costs of the proposed scheme can 
be easily compared with those of other schemes 
presented in Table 2 by calculating total required number 
of operations, as it is accomplished in Figure 2. Figure 2 
shows that the proposed scheme has a great 
computational advantage over exponentiation-based 
schemes while it provides the highest number of security 
attributes, as it is described in Table 1. 
 
Figure 2. Computational costs of different 
signcryption schemes using conventional methods 
5. Conclusions 
 
A directly public verifiable signcryption scheme based on 
elliptic curves is introduced in this paper that provides 
the attributes of message confidentiality, authentication, 
integrity, unforgeability, and non-repudiation. It provides 
the forward secrecy of message confidentiality so even if 
the sender's private key is revealed, no one else can 
extract the plaintext of the previously signcrypted texts. It 
is directly public verifiable so anyone can verify the 
signature without any need for any secret information 
from the corresponding participants. It has great 
computational advantages over traditional schemes, and 
is so suitable for resource-constrained environments.  
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